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I became involved in the education testing debate purely by 
chance.  I did not begin as an advocate for standardized testing. And, 
truth be told, I am still not motivated primarily by a fondness for 
standardized testing, despite the fact that I have come to deeply 
appreciate its benefits and strengths. I am strongly motivated, 
however, against deliberate misrepresentation, censorship, and 
information suppression  
 
 
The General Accounting Office 
 
Over two decades ago, while working at the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO, now called the Government Accountability 
Office), I completed a study that measured the extent and cost of 
standardized testing in the United States (US GAO). The first president 
Bush, George H. W. Bush, had proposed a national assessment system 
that would test US students in five core subject areas at three grade 
levels. You probably have not known about it because the proposal 
died a natural death after President Bush lost his re-election bid in 
1992. Part of my job at the GAO was to estimate the proposed new 
testing system’s overlap with current testing—the time and cost it 
would add. In the process, I would also build a highly detailed 
database of state and local district assessment practices based on the 
GAO data collection. 
 
We did a remarkably good job with that study. We developed 
surveys carefully, reviewed and pretested them, and, through 
enormous persistence, achieved very high response rates. We 
collected budgets from most states and many school districts to use in 
benchmarking the survey results. A Who’s Who of notables in the 
evaluation, statistical, and psychometric worlds reviewed various 
aspects of the study (e.g., William Kruskal, Lee Sechrest, Mark Phelps, The Gauntlet    2 
 
Lipsey). Nothing like it in quality or scale had ever been done before, 
or has been done since.  
 
The many peer reviews from both inside and outside the GAO were 
rigorous, just as one would expect for an investigation into a key 
aspect of a major presidential proposal. On all GAO quality measures 
(e.g., survey response rates, fact-checking) the study exceeded GAO 
norms.   
 
The study results, however, were surprising, at least to me. I had 
been led to believe by the most accessible education policy literature 
that education testing was exceptionally costly and time consuming. It 
wasn’t, even when one accounted for all the opportunity costs in 
personnel time at all levels—national, state, school district, school, and 
classroom. In 1990–1991, systemwide (i.e., external) testing and test-
related activity comprised on average about seven hours per year of a 
student’s time and about $15 in purchase costs and staff time. 
 
Others were surprised by the results as well. One of the outside 
reviewers, Margaret “Peg” Goertz, from the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Graduate School of Education provided my first taste of 
a type of reaction that would later become very familiar, one more 
emotional than substantive. My results could not possibly be correct, 
she argued, I must have left something out. Tests cost more and take 
up more educator time than I had found, she was certain. She insisted 
on some additional calculations, which I made, that still did not satisfy. 
But, she would have other, more public opportunities in the future to 
cast doubts on my work. 
 
For those not familiar with research of this type, judgments of its 
quality, and the trustworthiness of the results, are typically 
benchmarked by two aspects: the size and representativeness of the 
sample of relevant units—public education administrative units in this 
case—and the scope of the measures—(i.e., were all relevant 
components of cost and time accounted for?). I made every effort to 
make certain that not a single relevant cost or time component was 
neglected and, conversely, that no extraneous cost or time 
components were included.  
 
Since then, I have come to better appreciate that effort for, as far 
as I can tell, no study of the extent or cost of testing in the U.S. since 
has come anywhere close to matching its scale and coverage. With 
prodding and many follow up letters and calls, I received complete 
survey responses from all 48 states with testing programs in 1990–3  Nonpartisan Education Review, v.10, n.1 
 
1991, and from over 600 school districts–encompassing a robust 
nationally representative sample.  
 
Most studies in the two decades since have reported partial 
information: only for the state level, only from a few to several school 
districts, or only the purchase costs of tests and test contractor 
services (and not the opportunity costs of education personnel time).
1  
 
The GAO, however, has a single client—the US Congress. Once a 
report has been presented to Congress, no further dissemination effort 
is made. 
 
 
The Center for Research on Educational Standards and Student 
Testing (CRESST) 
 
I left the GAO for other employment before the report was actually 
released in January 1993 and, apparently, pressure to suppress the 
report and its findings (essentially, that standardized testing is not 
burdensome and does not cost that much) descended even before it 
was released.
2 Over the ensuing months, I became gradually aware of 
more efforts to suppress or misrepresent the report’s findings. Panels 
were held at conferences criticizing the report—panels to which I was 
not invited. Reports were written by the federally funded research 
center, the Center for Research on Evaluation, Standards and Student 
Testing (CRESST), and elsewhere, lambasting it and suggesting that 
                                   
1 Some have argued that an opportunity cost of student time “lost” to testing should 
also be included. But, that assumes that students do not learn anything when taking 
a test and they would be learning something if the time were not used for testing. As 
it turns out, a very large research literature affirms that students are more likely to 
learn when taking a test (see, for example, Phelps, 2012). So, if it were to be 
considered for inclusion, the opportunity cost of student time in testing should be 
subtracted from the cost calculations. 
 
2 For reasons never explained to me, the working title that I gave the study, and that 
had passed through all internal and external reviews—“Student Testing: Current 
Extent and Cost, With Cost Estimates for National Examination.”—was changed to 
“…Current Extent and Expenditures…”. This, despite the fact that we used line-item 
budget data—expenditure data—only to validate the survey data from state and local 
testing directors, which could be quite different. Line item expenditures may or may 
not categorize relevant expenditures neatly; usually they do not. As it turned out, 
this change substantially aided the censorial efforts the GAO report’s chief mis-
representers—David Monk and Larry Picus—who claimed that it ignored the 
opportunity costs of personnel time. In fact, the majority of costs in the GAO 
calculations were of personnel time. 
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better studies were needed.
3 The characterizations of the GAO report 
were completely false—the critics claimed that information was left out 
that, in fact, was not, and that information was included that, in fact, 
was not. But, reasonable people, allowed hearing only one version of 
the story, believed it, and the GAO report, along with probably the 
most thorough and detailed data base on state and local testing 
practices ever developed, started fading into obscurity. 
 
After I presented the results of the GAO study at a different 
education research conference in 1998 (Phelps, 1998), a man standing 
at the back of the room suggested that the study was worthless since I 
had not considered opportunity costs. I asked him to identify which 
costs were left out, but he did not respond and shortly thereafter left 
the room. The damage had been done—he had suggested to many in 
the room that my study was critically lacking and not worth reading. 
Who was he? Peg Goertz’s husband.  
 
In place of the GAO study, other reports were written and 
presented at conferences, and articles published in mainstream 
education journals, purporting to show that standardized tests cost an 
enormous amount and were overwhelming school schedules in their 
volume. Other 1990s-era studies were based on tiny samples, a single 
field trial in a few schools, a few telephone calls, one state, or, in some 
cases, the facts were just made up. The cost studies among them that 
actually used some data for evidence tended to heap all sorts of non-
test activities into the basket and call them costs of tests. 
 
The two testing cost studies that CRESST promoted in three 
successive annual conferences were based on a tiny sample (from a 
New Standards Project field trial) and a single state (Kentucky). (See 
Monk, 1995; Picus & Tralli) In the latter, survey responses were 
apparently accepted as is without review; for example, they included a 
response claiming that salaries of school personnel for the entire 
school year should be considered test preparation, and added to the 
cost of tests. Both studies were widely praised and disseminated.  
 
                                   
3 For example, 1993 CRESST Conference: Assessment Questions: Equity Answers: 
What Will Performance Assessment Cost?, Monday, September 13; 1994 CRESST 
Conference: Getting Assessment Right: Practical and Cost Issues in Implementing 
Performance Assessment, Tuesday, September 13; 1995 CRESST Conference: 
Assessment at the Crossroads: What are the Costs of Performance Assessment?, 
Tuesday, September 12. CRESST report #441 still contains mostly erroneous claims 
related to the GAO report, on pages 5 and 64--66, and mostly erroneous claims 
about CRESST’s work on the issue, in the first seventeen pages. 5  Nonpartisan Education Review, v.10, n.1 
 
I wrote dozens of polite letters and made dozens of polite telephone 
calls to the researchers of those two studies who asserted the 
erroneous claims about the GAO study—David Monk and Larry Picus—
to those responsible at the organizations promoting their work, and to 
the US Education Department, which funded (and still continues to 
fund) CRESST. In most cases, I was simply ignored. In a few cases, I 
received assurances, first, that the matter would be looked into—it 
was not—and, second, that an erratum would be published in the 
CRESST newsletter—it never was. I submitted articles based on the 
GAO study to mainstream education journals and they were rejected 
for outlandish and picayune reasons, or because "everyone knows" 
that the GAO report was flawed. 
 
The response from the US Education Department (US ED) program 
officer was particularly revealing. CRESST has operated for three 
decades under repeatedly renewed federal grants. Consequently, it 
has been the only federally funded research center focused on testing 
policy, ever. These many millions have bestowed on CRESST directors 
and affiliated scholars enormous power to decide which and whose 
research becomes known and which and whose does not. It has also 
served grandly to advance the careers of CRESST-affiliated scholars.  
 
I complained to the relevant US ED grant program officer that 
CRESST had misrepresented the GAO report in three successive annual 
conferences, denied my request to attend, and ignored my requests to 
add errata in their publications. He refused to do anything. CRESST 
was responsible for any “editorial” matters, he said, and he had no 
authority to intervene. This fellow has just recently retired after a few 
decades at US ED where he did, apparently, not much.  
 
Ultimately, after years of being polite and following designated 
communication channels to no effect, I felt forced to take the issue 
public and wrote a commentary concerning the misrepresentation of 
the GAO report in an education finance journal that had published a 
lead article by David Monk mis-characterizing and dismissing it 
(Phelps, 1996). Journal editorial staff working at the sponsoring 
organization—The Association of School Business Officials—refused to 
accommodate my manuscript in any way. Perhaps that was because I, 
someone unknown to them, was criticizing the behavior of two 
education finance professors well known to them and serving on their 
editorial board.  
 
Forced to end run regular channels again, I contacted the editor of 
the journal directly. She allowed the manuscript publication, and Phelps, The Gauntlet    6 
 
provided space for David Monk to respond (Monk, 2006; Phelps, 
2006). I had made every reasonable effort to inform Monk that he was 
misrepresenting the GAO report, including sending him technical 
documents and instruments from the GAO project work at his request. 
Still, three years passed, he continued his misrepresentation, and 
exaggerated the alleged uniqueness of his own and his friend Larry 
Picus’ work. 
 
Anyone prone to give Monk and Picus the benefit of the doubt and 
assume that they misread a GAO report that did not state clearly 
enough what components were included in the cost calculations should 
reconsider. It is simply not possible to read the GAO report in any 
depth and not understand that the opportunity costs of personnel time 
were included in the calculations. The fact is noted starting on page 1 
and on most pages thereafter. The fact is noted in the introduction, 
the conclusion, and every chapter in between. The fact is included in 
many of the figures and tables.  
 
Either Monk and Picus deliberately misrepresented the GAO report, 
perhaps in an effort to promote their own work, or they never read 
any of the report, despite suggesting intimate familiarity. 
 
In my space in the school finance journal, I criticized Monk for 
behavior that was clearly censorial. He had blatantly and repeatedly 
misrepresented the GAO report, in a way that discredited it and 
encouraged the public to dismiss it. With Monk’s response, I would 
receive my first taste of another kind of reaction that would later 
become very familiar—he accused me of being censorial simply by 
criticizing his work and behavior. After years’ of continuous effort 
discrediting my work, he wrote magnanimously that everyone’s work 
should be considered and respected.  
 
Not even the journal commentary-response with Monk stopped 
their misrepresentation of the GAO report though. Larry Picus 
published a CRESST report two years later with all of their 
misrepresentations intact (Picus & Tralli). I managed to convince a 
new director at CRESST to excise one offending paragraph, but several 
others remain. 
 
Ultimately, a paper based on the GAO report won a national prize. 
Later, I updated the GAO study results with data from 1998–1999 and 
inflation-adjusted cost figures. An article based on those up-to-date 
estimates of the extent and cost of testing in the United States was 
published in the back pages of the Journal of Education Finance.
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article on testing costs by Monk based on data from one ill-fated 
project’s test field trial had been published a few years earlier as lead 
in the same journal. 
 
My journal article was published in 2000, just prior to the first US 
presidential election campaign with standardized testing a key issue 
for debate. The eventually victorious Republican Party candidate, 
George W. Bush, proposed a national testing program modeled on one 
in Texas—in the accountability provisions of the No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) Act. 
 
Thus, the current extent and cost of testing, and any possible 
increase due to the President’s proposal, again became national issues. 
Studies were conducted on some aspects of the topic, for example by 
Ted Rebarber of Accountability Works and the Pew Center’s 
Stateline.org. (See Accountability Works, 2004 & Danitz) 
 
 
The National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
The most widely publicized report on testing costs from the early 
2000s, however, was that of Carolyn Hoxby (2002), of Harvard, then 
Stanford University and long-time director of the education program at 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Her work on the 
topic is the most widely known because she is affiliated with 
organizations that invest a great deal of money in publicity and 
dissemination. 
 
I first became interested in Hoxby’s work after noticing that report 
after report published by the NBER on education topics claimed to be 
the first ever to study their topic or declared there to have been no 
prior research on a topic (Phelps, 2012a). Normally, that might not 
seem interesting, but in each case, many prior studies had been 
conducted. 
 
In her own study of testing costs, Hoxby doesn’t refer to prior work 
at all. But, her work is hardly noteworthy, either. She looked at 
budgetary expenditures for testing programs from less than half the 
US states. Even had she obtained it from all states, such data are 
problematic because some costs induced by testing end up in other 
categories in accounting spreadsheets, and vice versa. Moreover, she 
didn’t look at all at local school and school district costs, which 
sometimes dwarf state costs. 
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The National Research Council 
 
The CRESST folk re-entered the testing cost debate with a report 
from the Board on Testing and Assessment (BOTA) at the National 
Research Council (NRC), a group that they captured in the late 1980s 
and have held as their own ever since (Phelps 2008/2009, 2012b). The 
2008 BOTA-NRC report, Common Standards for K–12 Education?, 
asserts, again, that the GAO report left something out and so 
underestimated the cost of testing (Beatty).
4 And, again, the assertion 
is false. This time, the NRC accused the GAO study of neglecting to 
consider the cost of “standard setting” during test development; in 
fact, this cost was fully accrued in the GAO calculations.
5  
 
Claiming a void in others’ calculations is used as an excuse to bulk 
up their own cost estimates massively. Here are just several ways that 
the NRC report, Common Standards for K–12 Education?, 
overestimates the cost of testing: 
 
One-time-only start-up costs—e.g., standard (i.e., passing-score) 
setting—are counted as annual recurring costs. 
 
Educator travel and lodging expenses for serving on standard-
setting and other test development panels are counted twice, both 
as direct educator expenses and in the budget of the state 
education agency (which, in fact, reimburses the educators for 
these expenses). 
 
                                   
4 On pp. 8–9 of the background paper "The Resource Costs of Standards, 
Assessments, and Accountability" (Harris & Taylor, 2008) one reads "On the other 
hand, neither Phelps nor the GAO study ascribes any costs to standard setting...." 
 
5 Test developers often confusingly use the phrase “standard setting” to identify two 
entirely different phases of test development. There is the development, or “setting”, 
of academic content standards and expected performance levels that takes place 
before the development of a standardized test even starts. Then, much later in the 
test development process, after some test forms have already been administered, 
groups of educators, experts, and public officials gather to decide how to score the 
new test. Often, but not always, the “standard” being set at these meetings is the 
passing score for the new test, and the meetings are sometimes called “passing-
score setting” meetings. But, the traditional, albeit confusing, label of “standard 
setting” is still widely used. The GAO study included all costs for the latter type of 
standard setting—passing score setting—contrary to the claims in the NRC report. 
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The full duration of all testing activities at a school—said to be 3–5 
days—is allotted to each and every educator participating. So, for 
example, the time of a fifth grade teacher who administers a one-
hour math exam on Tuesday of testing week, and who otherwise 
teaches regular class that week, is counted as if s/he were involved 
in administering each and every exam in every subject area and at 
every grade level throughout the entire 3–5 days. Moreover, the 
time of each and every teacher in the school is counted as if each 
and every teacher is present in each and every testing room for all 
subject areas and grade levels. By this method, the NRC 
overestimates the amount of educator time spent directly 
administering tests about twenty-fold. 
 
  Another way of looking at it is to ignore the fact that a school 
administers a series of one-hour tests across the tested subject 
areas and grade levels over the span of 3–5 days but, instead, 
assume that all classes in all subject areas and grade levels are 
sitting for 3–5 days doing nothing but taking 3–5-day-long exams, 
which, in fact, is not what happens.  
 
The NRC calculates the number of teachers involved by using a 
federally-estimated average pupil-teacher ratio, rather than an 
average class size estimate. Pupil-teacher ratios underestimate 
class sizes because they include the time of teachers when they are 
not teaching. By this method, the NRC overestimates the number of 
teachers involved in directly administering tests by another 50%. 
 
The NRC counts all teachers in a school, even though only those in 
certain grade levels and subject areas are involved in testing—
usually amounting to fewer than half a school’s teachers. By this 
method, the NRC overestimates the number of teachers involved in 
directly administering tests by another 50% or more. 
 
In calculating “data administration costs” of processing test data in 
school districts and states, the NRC classifies all who work in these 
offices as “management, business, and financial” professionals who 
make $90,000/year. Anyone who has worked in state and local 
government data processing departments knows that this would 
grossly overestimate the real wages of the majority of these 
employees who, essentially, work as clerical and, oftentimes, 
contingent staff. 
 
The NRC is told by one school district that their average teacher 
spends 20 hours every year in professional development related to Phelps, The Gauntlet    10 
 
assessment and accountability. Despite how preposterous this 
number should sound, this one piece of hearsay is used by the NRC 
to estimate the amount of time all teachers everywhere, whether 
involved in testing or not, spend annually in related professional 
development. 
 
Moreover, professional development related to testing and 
accountability is assumed to be unrelated to regular instruction and, 
so, is counted as a completely separate, added-on (i.e., marginal) 
cost. 
 
The NRC counts educator time working on standard-setting and 
other test development panels as “two or three days” which, as 
anyone who has worked in test development knows, is a high 
estimate. One to two days is more realistic. 
 
Finally, the NRC studied testing and accountability in only several 
school districts in only three states. But, according to them, the GAO 
report, which analyzed more detail from all 48 states with testing 
programs and over 500 school districts …is the study that left stuff 
out. In the end, the NRC estimates for testing and accountability costs, 
are in their own words “about six times higher” than previous 
estimates.  
 
In addition to the usual suspects from CRESST, Peg Goertz played a 
key role in the presentation of the 2008 NRC report. And, recall that 
she was a reviewer for the original GAO report so, presumably, she 
had read it in detail. 
 
For several years after, each of the two most recognizable sides in 
US education policy debates had their own testing costs research 
champion. The education reformers, think tankers, and Republican 
Party advocates had Carolyn Hoxby’s numbers, which hugely 
underestimate the cost of testing programs. The education schools, 
educator professional associations, and Democratic Party advocates 
had the CRESST-NRC numbers, which grossly overestimate the cost of 
testing programs. Anything in between was either ignored or 
misrepresented.
6 
                                   
6 This is hardly the only issue where education establishment and think tankers 
present opposing assertions as facts, with both being wrong, misleading, or 
exaggerated. Up until the mid-2000s, for example, education establishment folk 
favored the use of a “graduation rate” that grossly overestimated the actual 
proportion of students who begin high school and later graduate. Since then, think 
tankers have managed to institute a different measure that grossly underestimates 11  Nonpartisan Education Review, v.10, n.1 
 
 
 
The Brookings Institution 
 
These days, the education policy topic du jour is the Common Core 
Standards, and standardized testing is a key component of the 
planned program. Naturally, one could expect a think tank to weigh in 
on the matter of their possible costs, and the Brookings Institution has 
done so with the work of yet another Harvard University economics or 
political science PhD (political science in this case). 
 
Several months ago, the Brookings Institution began promoting a 
report written by Matthew M. Chingos, like so many other think tank 
residents, a former graduate student of Paul Peterson’s. Chingos 
begins by clearing the field before him first. 
 
“Unfortunately, there is little comprehensive up-to-date 
information on the costs of assessment systems currently in place 
throughout the country. This report seeks to fill this void by 
providing the most current, comprehensive evidence on state-level 
cost of assessment systems, based on new data gathered from 
state contracts with testing vendors.” (Chingos, p. 1) 
 
“[Other] Estimates of these costs are based primarily on 
assumptions and guesswork, …. The most comprehensive 
nationwide data were collected about a decade ago, in separate 
investigations by Caroline Hoxby and the Pew Center for the 
States.” (p. 4) 
 
The latter snipe—“Estimates of these costs are based primarily on 
assumptions and guesswork…”—was directed at two other studies, that 
he presumably also considers to be not as “comprehensive” as his, 
cited in the accompanying footnote. Read the Brookings report in 
detail, however, and one will discover their own abundance of 
assumptions and guesswork. 
 
Like Chingos, Hoxby and the Pew Center looked only at the direct 
costs of testing at the state-level, and not at the more consequential 
data at the local level, or any data at all on personnel time (outside 
the easiest-to-locate line items in state budgets). As Chingos wasn’t 
looking at those cost components—absolutely necessary for a 
                                                                                                       
that proportion (e.g., by counting those who take more than four years to graduate 
or transfer schools as dropouts). (See Phelps, 2005.) Phelps, The Gauntlet    12 
 
complete cost estimate—perhaps he did not wish to draw attention to 
other studies that included them (e.g., Accountability Works, 2004; 
and Phelps, 2000). 
 
As for those other cost components, Chingos pleads that they are 
too difficult to measure. Take, for example the time spent by state 
employees in “selecting contractors and overseeing the vendors”:  
 
“But such costs are difficult to track consistently across states, and 
usually represent a small fraction of the testing budget”. (p. 7) 
 
This is disingenuous. State employees typically do far more than 
just “oversee” the vendors. And these costs are not “small”, though 
they may be a small fraction of the testing budget. The costs are 
absorbed in other parts of the budget, in the regular salaries for staff 
positions that probably would not exist if there were no testing 
program. Collectively, they can represent a large portion of the cost of 
a testing program. 
 
“The roles played by school and district officials who aid in test 
administration and scoring are important as well, but the cost of 
this work is challenging to measure. Calculating such costs requires 
information on which employees have these responsibilities, their 
compensation levels, how much time they devote to test-related 
activities,…” (p. 7) 
 
Yes, it is challenging to measure. Yes, it does require information 
on responsibilities, compensation levels, and time devoted to test-
related activities. So, did Chingos and the Brookings Institution accept 
those challenges and gather that difficult-to-gather information? 
(Note: the GAO study did both.) No, they claimed that it was too hard.  
 
Chingos and Brookings dismiss the 2008 BOTA-NRC cost estimates 
as irrelevant because “…these costs are data collected from only three 
states and reflect the costs of standards and accountability systems in 
addition to the assessment costs” (Chingos, p. 27, footnote 10). In 
fact, the BOTA-NRC estimates did not reflect the costs of standards 
and accountability systems in addition to the assessment costs. They 
simply double counted the cost of “standard setting” (i.e., “passing 
score” setting) sessions. Like the National Research Council report 
authors, Chingos and the Brookings Institution do not seem to know 
the first thing about how tests are developed. 
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Other excuses for not being comprehensive, even while repeatedly 
boasting about being the most comprehensive: 
 
“Time spent preparing for end-of-year tests may also be 
considered a ‘cost,’ but it is one that is nearly impossible to 
measure given the difficulty of separating instructional time that 
is geared specifically towards preparation for the test as 
compared to for some other purpose.” (p. 38, footnote 36) 
 
“For these contracts, we either ignore the development costs 
(instead focusing on the contract costs during operational test 
years) or divide the development costs equally over the 
operational years.” (p. 8) 
 
The Brookings’ estimates of testing costs are suspect because they 
are far from comprehensive. They do not include, or even attempt to 
include personnel costs, at either the state or local levels. Neither do 
they include any local costs. Ironically, for a report that repeatedly 
boasts of being the most comprehensive, the report’s single greatest 
lack is comprehensiveness. (For an interesting contrast, see 
Accountability Works, 2012, or Nelson) 
 
After the measly and skewed testing cost estimates all that is left of 
value in the Brookings report is the revelation about saving money on 
testing through state consortia, an idea they may have lifted right out 
of the GAO report.  
 
 
Crony research dissemination 
 
The GAO project work was not just unfairly criticized by education’s 
vested interests; it was annihilated. All that enormous effort, all that 
considerable expense—funded by US taxpayers—was so thoroughly 
and effectively discredited by CRESST, Monk, Picus, the Goertz’s, and 
other sympathizers that barely a trace of it remains in the collective 
working memory of education policy, or anywhere else outside my own 
cranium and computer hard drive.  
 
Education’s vested interests employed the false accusation that my 
GAO work ignored the costs of personnel time to discredit it. Ironically, 
in their work, the think tankers have ignored the opportunity costs of 
personnel time absolutely, seem to have never felt any obligation to 
include it, yet still claim comprehensiveness.  
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It would seem that if one has been accepted into the education 
research aristocracy of think tanks or federally funded centers, even 
skimpy, shoddy work will be called great. Meanwhile, the highest 
quality work from those of the vast research working classes is flicked 
away like a stinkbug.  
 
This latest report from the Brookings Institution faithfully continues 
a 21
st century tradition of information suppression, misinformation, 
and self-promotion in education policy research from our country’s 
best-known and best-funded think tanks.  
 
But, censorship isn’t the only problem; the process is corrupt. This 
particular type of corruption does not only involve money. The 
currency of scholars is attention, with the “richest” among them 
achieving the most—genuine fame—celebrity status that floods a 
confluence of honors, awards, and remuneration streams. 
 
Both the NRC and think tank reports mentioned above may be used 
to proselytize and mislead. But, more emphatically, they are 
expropriated to showcase the careers of those involved. At the same 
time the report authors declare the work of other researchers inferior 
or nonexistent, they liberally cite their own work and that of their close 
friends, and package the combination as if it were all that matters.  
 
Journalists, unfortunately, simply assume that the easy-to-obtain 
work of think tanks and federally funded centers validly represents the 
research literature as a whole. They simply assume that education 
research dissemination is objective and fair. They couldn’t be more 
wrong.  
 
But, some journalists step further into an ethical abyss—they help 
promote dismissive reviews. No journalist has the time to validate 
such claims; it can take years to learn a research literature. So, every 
time a journalist writes “there is a paucity of research on this topic”, or 
the like, they’re just taking one very self-interested person’s word for 
it. Every time a journalist writes “there is little research in this area” or 
“so-and-so’s study is the first of its kind” they are complicit in the 
corruption.  
 
The National Research Council’s BOTA was captured decades ago by 
CRESST-affiliated researchers. A small clique of faculty from Harvard 
and Stanford Universities has captured the education policy function at 
the country’s most prominent think tanks. (Similarly, many argue that 
the education research function at the National Science Foundation has 15  Nonpartisan Education Review, v.10, n.1 
 
been captured by radical constructivists who channel money to friends 
and others like-minded.)   
 
The tragic results illustrate how federal and foundation money can 
concentrate power to achieve exactly the opposite result from that 
intended. Once these small, cohesive groups captured the larger 
organizations, they focused their efforts on restricting entry into policy 
arenas to those their own circles. The careers of those inside these 
groups have soared. Meanwhile, the amount of objective information 
available to policymakers and the public—our collective working 
memory—has shrunk. 
 
The stated mandates of these organizations are to objectively 
review all the research available; instead they promote their own and 
declare most of the rest nonexistent. They are mandated to serve the 
public interest; instead they serve their own. 
 
Currently, too few people have too much influence over those who 
control the education research purse strings. And, those who control 
the purse strings have too much influence over policy decisions. Until 
folk at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the US Education 
Department—to mention just a couple of consistent funders of 
education policy debacles—broaden their networks, expand their 
reading lists, and open their minds to more intellectual diversity, they 
will continue to produce education policy failure. 
 
It would help if they would fund a wider pool of education 
researchers, evidence, and information. In recent years, they have, 
instead, encouraged the converse—funding a saturating dissemination 
of a narrow pool of information—thereby contributing to US education 
policy’s number 1 problem: pervasive misinformation.   
 
 
So what? 
 
The aggressive, career-strategic behavior of researchers in federally 
funded centers and think tanks creates many problems, including a 
loss of useful information and bad public policies based on skewed 
information. 
 
But, two adverse consequences worry me the most. First, these 
badly behaved researchers are the only ones that most journalists and 
policy-makers pay any attention to. 
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Second, the effects of their bad behavior are spreading overseas. 
The education testing research function at the World Bank, for 
example, has been handed down over the past few decades from one 
scholar affiliated with Boston College’s School of Education to another. 
True to form, they cite the research they like, some of which is their 
own, most of the rest of which comes from CRESST, and imply that 
the vast majority of relevant research does not exist.
7 
 
More recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) published a completely one-sided study on 
educational assessment that ignores most of the relevant research 
literature and highlights that conducted at a certain US federal 
research center and several US think tanks (Phelps 2013, 2014). Their 
skewed recommendations are now the world’s. 
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